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CRIMINAL PROCED~EVIDENCE-Composite
Drawing Not Producible Under Jencks ActUnited States v. Zurita*
Following a bank robbery, the bank manager and his wife provided descriptions enabling an agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to compose drawings of the robbers which were then
"approved" by each of these witnesses as being substantially accurate.1 At the defendant's trial four years later, he was identified by
the manager and his wife as one of the robbers.2 The defendant, in
an attempt to impeach their testimony,3 requested that the government be compelled under the Jencks Act4 to produce the original
composite drawings. 5 The trial court denied this request, stating
that the production of these drawings was not required by the Act.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held,
affirmed, one judge dissenting. A composite drawing is not a producible "statement" within the terms of the Jencks Act.
The Jencks Act provides that in criminal prosecutions by the
federal government a court shall, on motion of the defendant, order
the United States to produce any "statement" of a ·witness which
relates to the subject matter of his testimony. 6 Subsection (e) of the
Act defines a "statement" as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.7

The defendant in the principal case argued that a composite drawing is within the definition, either as a "written statement" adopted
• 369 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1023 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as principal case].
I. Principal case at 480 (dissenting opinion); see Brief for Appellee in the principal
case at 12; Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8, 19-21.
2. Principal case at 480 (dissenting opinion). The four-year delay in identification
of the defendant magnifies the importance to the defendant of using the drawing as
a means of testing the witnesses' recollection.
3. Obviously the defendant thought that the picture might not look anything like
him.
4. 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1964).
5. This Note will deal only with the question of a defendant's right under the
Jencks Act to inspect a composite drawing. It will not analyze issues related to the
admissibility of such a drawing or its value as impeachment evidence. However, there
does not seem to be any evidentiary bar against the use of a drawing for impeachment
purposes. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040, at 727 (3d ed. 1940).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1964). Since the witnesses in the principal case testified
regarding the defendant's description, there is no question that the drawing relates to
subject matter about which the witness testified. See Brief for Appellee in the principal
case at 12; Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8, 19-21.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1964).
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by a witness under clause (I) or as a type of "recording" which is
substantially a verbatim recital of a witness' oral statement under
clause (2). 8 The Seventh Circuit rejected both interpretations: the
former because a drawing is not a "·written statement"; the latter
because a composite drawing necessarily involves an agent's subjective interpretation and thus cannot be considered a verbatim
recital of the witness' oral statement.9 It is submitted that the court's
interpretation of clause (I) was not required by existing authority
and was, as a policy matter, unnecessarily restrictive.
In Jencks v. United States, 10 which led to the passage of the
Jencks Act, the Supreme Court held that when the federal government initiated a criminal prosecution it waived the privilege to
protect government reports to the extent that such reports were
relevant to the accused's defense. The waiver extended even to
reports of confidential nature; 11 the only restrictions imposed by the
Court were that the request for production be for a specific document12 which is competent, relevant, and not shielded from discovery
by any other exclusionary rule. 13 Obviously concerned that this holding might endanger the national security, dry up the government's
sources of information, and destroy the private character of confidential documents,14 Congress reacted immediately15 by passing the
8. See principal case at 475; Petition for Rehearing in the principal case at 2-4.
For the view that a composite drawing ought to be admissible under clause (2), see
Note, Composite Drawings Are Not "Statements" Within the Jencks Act, 5 HousroN L.
REY. 178 (1967).
9. Principal case at 477. This Note will focus on the propriety of permitting
production of composite drawings over defendant's motion under clause (1).
10. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
II. In the Jencks case, the Court stated:
[T]he Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting
the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the
Government which prosecutes the accused also has the duty to see that justice is
done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be
material to his defense • • • .
Id. at 671 [quoting from United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)].
12. 353 U.S. at 667. See generally Orfield, Discovery During Trial in Federal
Criminal Cases: The Jencks Act, 18 Sw. L.J. 212, 214 (1964) (discussing former federal
practice); Comment, The Jencks Right: Judicial and Legislative Modifications, the
States and the Future, 50 VA. L. REv. 535 (1964) (discussing present state practice).
13. For the purpose of production and inspection, "relevancy" is established when
the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness. The requirement of
being outside of any other exclusionary rule indicates that the government might
still exclude such things as the "work-product" of an agent. The government cannot,
however, exclude statements by invoking the governmental secrecy privilege.
14. In his dissenting opinion in Jencks, Justice Clark aroused great public concern
when he stated:
Unless the Congress changes the rule announced by the Court today, those
intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as well
close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus
afforded hini a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information
as well as national vital secrets.
353 U.S. at 681·82 (1957). Upcoming communist spy trials also induced Congress to.
act promptly in order to eliminate the dilemma of either having to divulge national
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Jencks Act, which established a procedure designed to secure certain
discovery rights for defendants in federal criminal trials while at the
same time preventing needless disclosure of confidential or sensitive
information.16 If the government contests a defendant's motion for
production of a witness' prior statement, the Act provides for in
camera court inspection of the statement and delivery to the defendant of only the parts of the statement deemed related to the particular witness' testimony.17 Should the government refuse to
produce any related statement, the Act requires that the court strike
that witness' testimony or, if justice dictates, declare a mistrial. 18
Although the issue of the applicability of the Act to composite
drawings was one of first impression,19 the scope of subsection(e)(l)
has been the subject of litigation. In Palermo v. United States, 20 the
Supreme Court indicated that the word "statement" was not to be
interpreted broadly21 and upheld a trial court's conclusion that an
agent's 600-word summary of a three-and-one-half-hour conference
with a witness was not producible under the terms of the Act. 22 The
secrets or free spies without a trial. See generally S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. 7-12 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 7-14 (1957) (including statements by Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States; David
W. Kendall, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; and Abe McGregor Goff of the Post
Office Dept.). Finally, Congress was concerned about misapplication of the Jencks rule
because the government had no right to appeal a lower court's dismissal for noncompliance with a production order. 103 CONG. REc. 15,941 (1957) (remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney).
15. H.R. 7915, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), was introduced the day after the Supreme
Court decision, and was the first of eleven House bills designed to alter the rule of
the Jencks case.
16. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1957).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1964). Under the Jencks decision the prosecution had to
turn over to defense counsel all prior statements of witnesses which were logically
related to their testimony so that counsel could determine whether any of the statements would be useful for impeachment purposes.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1964). The Jencks decision had provided for dismissal of
the case and contempt proceedings for failure to produce statements. See generally
Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J. 477,
485-90 (1964); Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J.
674, 697 (1958).
19. Principal case at 476.
20. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). The Palermo case is noted in Casenote, Jencks Act Construed
-Palermo v. United States, 21 Mo. L. REv. 153 (1961); Comment, Constitutional LawDue Process and Right of Confrontation-Jencks Act, 58 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1960);
Comment, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1133, 1134 (1963).
21. 360 U.S. at 353, 360. See also Comment, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, supra
note 20, at 1134; Casenote, supra note 20.
22. 360 U.S. at 353, 360; accord, United States v. Aviles, 337 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. Yetman, 196 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Conn. 1961). Contra, Papworth
v. United States, 256 F.2d 125, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1958) (defendant entitled to relevant
portions of original notebook in which the FBI agent recorded highlights of a conversation which, according to the court, were substantially verbatim statements). The
importance of a ruling as to whether a drawing is within the requirements of the
Act is emphasized by the fact that the Act is the exclusive remedy for the production
of a government witness' statement for impeachment purposes. Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 349, 356, app. A (1959).
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Court stated that Congress intended to require the production of
only those documents which contained the witness' own words or
which could fairly be deemed to reflect fully and without distortion
what the witness had said.23 Therefore, the Court indicated that
summaries of a witness' oral statements which evidence a substantial
selection of material by the agent, which were prepared without the
aid of complete notes, or which contain an agent's interpretations
or impressions were not producible.24
However, four years later, in Campbell v. United States, 25 the
Supreme Court seemed to shift away from this strict interpretation
of "statement." In Campbell, an agent, upon completion of his interview with a witness, orally repeated the substance of the interview
and secured the witness' approval of that summary. Seven hours
later, the agent dictated an "interview report" relying primarily
upon his notes but also upon memory. The Court upheld the trial
court's determination that the report was producible under subsection (e)(l) of the Act as a written statement adopted by a witness.26
Thus, a statement not written by the witness himself may nevertheless be producible if adopted by him; furthermore, approval of an
oral statement rather than the writing itself can constitute adoption. 27
These two cases may be reconcilable if considered in terms of
appellate deference to trial judges' factual determinations in evidentiary matters; however, the result in Campbell seems to indicate
a more liberal attitude toward producibility under the Jencks Act.
Indeed, although the majority in Campbell relied on Palermo as
definitive of the narrow role of appellate courts in reviewing lower
court determinations as to producibility,28 the dissent pointed out
that the restrictive interpretation of subsection (e)(l) set forth in
Palermo was undermined by extending that section of the Act to
include an "investigator's selections, interpretations, and interpolations."29 Nevertheless, the majority made it clear that their main
23. 360 U.S. at 353 n.11. The court did not feel that the statute, as interpreted,
raised any constitutional issues, since Congress has the power to prescribe rules of
procedure for the federal courts. But see notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
24-. 360 U.S. at 352. See generally Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286, 288-89
(D.C. Cir. 1964) [listing six factors determining producibility under clause (2)].
25. 373 U.S. 487 (1963). See generally Comment, supra note 20, at 1142-46 (1963).
The Court stated that the Act: " 'implies the duty in the trial judge affirmatively to
administer the statute in such way as can best secure relevant and available evidence .•• .'" Id. at 493 [quoting from Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 95
(1961)].
26. 373 U.S. at 495. The Court added: "It is settled, of course, that a written state•
ment, to be producible under § 3500(e)(I), need not be signed by the witness • • •
or written by him • . . or be a substantially verbatim recording of a prior oral
statement ••• .'' Id. at 492 n.6.
27. See id. at 492.
28. Id. at 493, 495.
29. Id. at 502 Uustice Clark, dissenting).
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·concern in interpreting the Act was to effectuate its primary purpose
-securing fairness for defendants in federal criminal trials.30
In the principal case, the Seventh Circuit relied primarily on the
strict interpretation given subsection (e)(l) in Palermo and gave
only passing notice to the Campbell decision.31 This reliance seems
misplaced in view of the Supreme Court's apparent shift away from
the Palermo standard in Campbell. Moreover, there are additional
arguments for including composite drawings within the definition
of "written statement" in subsection (e)(l).
Although composite drawings are not literally written statements,
they are in effect only an alternative means of recording the descriptive statement of a witness. By using modern techniques and competent personnel, law enforcement officials can create drawings which
accurately record descriptive statements.32 In fact, a composite drawing may provide a more meaningful collation of the various aspects
of the witness' description of the suspect's physical appearance than
could a verbatim written report, 33 which would be producible even
under Palermo. That such drawings subject the witness' statement
to the interpretations of the artist-agent should no longer preclude
their production. Despite language to the contrary in Palermo,34
the agent's interview report in Campbell was held producible even
30. Id. at 496-97.
31. See principal case at 477. The conflict between Palermo and Campbell may be
due to differences in the quality of the summaries involved, and thus this could provide
a basis for reconciling the cases. Some support for this view is contained in the
Campbell court's statement that a district judge is entitled to believe that an agent of
the FBI "of some fifteen years of experience would record a potential witness' statement with sufficient accuracy." Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 495 (1963).
32. Such drawings normally are created by using "image makers" and artists. It
is common practice not to show the witness the composite until it is finished. At this
time, corrections are made; if there is more than one witness, each of them is shown the
drawing and given an opportunity to correct it until each is satisfied. The best results
are achieved when (1) there is a good artist or machine operator who can respond
correctly to the witnesses' descriptions; (2) a witness has seen the criminal for a
significant length of time; and (3) good communication exists between witness and
artist or operator. In addition to obtaining a general verbal description, there is an
attempt to obtain peculiar features of the criminal. Thus, the hairline, type of nose,
scars, etc. are stressed as most relevant. Telephone interview with Inspector Theodore
Sienski, Robbery, "B. & E." Bureau, City of Detroit Police Department, November 13,
1967.
33. While no cases have previously dealt with the production of drawings under
the Jencks Act, a drawing does seem to satisfy the requirements of being a "statement" in other contexts. See generally United States v. Molin, 244 F. Supp. 1015, 1020
(D. Mass. 1965) (holding that a "statement" can take any form, including any kind of
appropriate marking which would be understood by the person looking at it); Bailey
v. State, 365 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (treating a photograph as a
statement or document). A narrow construction of "statement" under the Act would
appear to result in numerous loopholes by which the government could avoid discovery, yet still preserve the meaning of what was said. Everett, supra note 18, at 516;
Comment, supra note 20, at 891, 901; Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of
the Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 595, 612 (1960). See also
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361-63, 365 (1959) (concurring opinion).
34. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.

February 1968]

Recent Developments

777

though its preparation had involved selection of portions of the
witness' statement and was to that extent an "interpretation."
In addition, the court in the principal case stated that the purpose of subsection (e) of the Act is to insure "substantial fidelity of
recordation or reproduction" of the ·witness' statements.35 If a witness "adopts" a composite drawing upon its completion, as did the
witnesses in the principal case, the "substantial fidelity" of the recordation would seem to be established.36 Therefore, an interpretation of subsection (e) which would include composite drawings
within the term "written statement" would not thwart the purpose
of the subsection.
Furthermore, compelling production of such drawings would not
frustrate the Jencks Act's broader purpose of permitting discovery
of relevant statements37 while foreclosing unnecessary disclosures of
confidential information and potentially harmful fishing expeditions
through government files. 38 In the principal case, the drawing was
totally unrelated to national security and its production would not
have been harmful to the public interest.39 More important, the
35. Principal case at 477.
36. The witness in the principal case approved of the pictures as being substantially
similar to the robber's appearance. Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8.
37. 103 CONG. REc. 15,782 (remarks of Senator Ervin), 15,783 (remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney), 16,123 (remarks of Representatives O'Hara and Metcalf), 16,489 (remarks
of Senator Cooper) (1957). But cf. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957);
H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957); Comment, supra note 20, at 901;
Comment, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297, 313 (1959). See also
103 CONG. REc. 15,921 (remarks of Senator Dirksen), 16,739 (remarks of Representative
Keating) (1957).
38. The bill was to set standards of interpretation "(l) for safeguarding the needless
disclosure of confidential information in government files and at the same time (2)
assuring defendants access to the material in those files which is pertinent to the
testimony of government witnesses." H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
39. Moreover, the rush to get essential protective legislation passed before Congress
adjourned, the mentioning of a possible need for language revision in following sessions,
and the expression of lack of sufficient time for comprehensive thought and consideration, provide some support for the view that the courts should construe the
statutory language broadly. 103 CoNG. REc. 14,913 (remarks of Senator Clark), 16,113-14
(remarks of Representative Curtis) (1957); Keefe, Jinks and Jencks, a Study of Jencks
(remarks of Senator O'Mahoney), 16,124 (remarks of Representative Coffin), 16,742
(remarks of Representative Curtis) (1957); Keefe, Jinks and Jencks, a Study of Jencks
Versus United States in Depth, 7 CATIIouc U.L. REv. 91, 94 (1958). Final formation of
subsection (e) of the Act occurred during a Joint Conference only two days prior to
passage of the Act and to adjournment of Congress.
The Joint Conference was agreed to on August 27, 1957, and the bill was passed
by the Senate on August 29, 1957. 103 CONG. REc. 16,083, 16,488 (remarks of Senators
Mundt and Clark) 16,489-90 (1957). The fact the senators relied on the broad interpretation of the Act presented by Senator O'Mahoney, a sponsor of the legislation and
a Senate conferee, is further reason to construe the word "statement" broadly. 103 CoNG.
REC. 16,489 (remarks of Senators Clark & O'Mahoney) (1957). Senator O'Mahoney, in
answering a question regarding a requirement that certain photostats of records or of
pictures be submitted for examination by the defendant or his counsel, stated: "If
the pictures have anything to do with the statement of the witness-with either the
written statement or the oral statement-of course that would be part of it; but
whatever is produced must be related to the evidence of the witness who has testified
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defendant's request was for production of a single document and
thus could not be characterized as a fishing expedition.
In relation to the latter point, the court in the principal case
seemed to rely improperly on Ahlstedt v. United States.40 In that
case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied defendant's
motion for production of a large number of photographs which had
been shown to witnesses in an attempt to identify the participants
in a robbery.41 However, this denial did not seem to be based on the
fact that photographs rather than written statements were involved.
The court in Ahlstedt based its decision primarily on the notion that
it was preventing a fishing expedition through the prosecutor's "entire investigative files." Ahlstedt is thus not direct authority for
banning discovery of pictures under the Jencks Act. Indeed, it can
be inferred from the opinion that if the defendant's request had
been for a specific photograph it would have been granted. 42 Admittedly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently refused
to adopt such an inference. In United States v. Garrett,43 the Seventh
Circuit cited Ahlstedt as authority for its denial of defendant's
motion to produce one photograph which had been shown to witnesses for identification purposes. However, the Garrett opinion
indicates that the witnesses had never "adopted" the photograph,
and this factor alone could have been a reason for precluding its
production under subsection (e)(l). 44 Therefore, Garrett may be
distinguished from the principal case and should not foreclose a
favorable ruling on a motion for production of a composite drawing
which has been adopted by a witness.
Finally, there are some indications that a narrow interpretation
of subsection (e)(l) of the Act may raise constitutional problems.
Although the Jencks case itself was based on the Supreme Court's
power to act in matters of procedure,45 some recent cases suggest
that denial of a defendant's request for evidence material to his
defense violates due process. In Brady v. Maryland, 46 the Supreme
before the court in the criminal case." Following Senator O'Mahoney's remarks, the
Act was passed in the Senate by a vote of seventy-four to two. 103 CONG. REc. 16,489-90
(1957).
40. 325 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1963).
41. Id. at 259.
42. After noting that the defendant's motion sought to compel production of all
relevant documents and photographs used in the investigation, the court went on to
state that, "the District Court ruled, and we think correctly, that the Jencks Statute
does not apply to miscellaneous photographs." Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
43. 371 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 300.
45. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957). See also Comment, supra
note 20, at 898-903 (1960); Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the
Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 595 (1960).
46. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (1966);
Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure Duty and the Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. R.Ev.
206, 209 (1966).
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Court stated generally "that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution." 47 More
specifically, the four concurring justices in Palermo suggested that
a restricted interpretation of the Jencks Act could possibly give rise
to a sixth amendment right of confrontation issue. 48 They posed the
case in which a defendant is kept from inspecting criminal evidence
because it does not49 "meet the definition of statement in subsection
(e) of the statute."
These potential constitutional overtones provide additional support for a broad interpretation of "written statement" in subsection
(e)(1) of the Jencks Act. A broad construction, in addition to avoiding potential constitutional issues,50 would seem to be consistent
with recent authority on the scope of subsection (e)(1) and in accord
with the purposes of the Jencks Act. If a request for production is
confined to specific composite drawings and the fidelity of the recordation is established by a witness' "adoption," the drawings
should be producible.

47. 373 U.S. at 87.
48. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) (concurring opinion). See
generally Everett, supra note 18, at 516; Wexler, supra note 46, at 411; Comment,
supra note 20, at 891, 893; Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the
Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TExAs L. Rav. 595, 612 (1960).
49. 360 U.S. at 362.
50. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).

